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AN ALTERNATIVE SEMANTICS FOR KNOWLEDGE

GREGORY MELLEMA

In 1962, with the publication of Knowledge and Belief ([6]), Jaakko
Hintikka proposed an ingenious model set theoretic semantics for knowledge, KB. A somewhat unusual feature of KB, according to which 'Kap —> p9
is valid but i{x)KaFx -* (x)Fx9 is not, has been widely criticized. 1 It has
been felt that by reading ί{x)KaFx9 as ''Everything known to a is known by a
to be F" (as Hintikka does) rather than "Everything is known by a to be F"
(which entails "Everything is F") an unnatural restriction is placed upon
quantifiers ranging into epistemic contexts. Consequently, a number of
modifications of KB, have in recent years been proposed which manage to
avoid this feature. 2 In what follows I shall propose still another modification KB* of KB which lacks the Restricted Range feature (as I shall call the
invalidity of ((x)KaFx —> (x)Fx9 in a situation where ζKap —» p9 is valid). I
shall argue that KB* avoids a number of troublesome theorems which
show up in these other proposed systems and that the intuitions underlying
KB*, while slightly different from those underlying KB, are every bit as
natural. Consider:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

(x)Ka(x = x)
(x)(Ey)Ka(x = y)
(x)(y)(x = y^ Ka(x = y))
(x)Ka(Fx v - Fx).

It can easily be shown that all of these formulas are theorems in KB. Now
in KB (l)-(4) are read, respectively, as:
(5) Everyone known to a is known by a to be self-identical,
(6) For everyone known to a there is someone known to a such that they
are known by a to be identical,
(7) Any two persons known to a are, if identical, known by a to be identical
(8) Everyone known to a is known by a to be either F or not-F.
(Here for purposes of simplicity we assume that we are dealing with
domains of persons.) It may be a matter of dispute whether these readings
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are counter-intuitive. While it is my belief that (7) is somewhat counterintuitive, it is not clear that all of the others are; (6), for example, seems
on the surface to be entirely plausible. Now consider:
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)

Everyone is known by a
For everyone x there is
Any two persons are, if
Everyone is known by a

to be self-identical
someone known by a to be identical with x
identical, known by a to be identical
to be either F or not-F.

These are, respectively, the readings of (l)-(4) in each of the proposed
variations of KB which lack the Restricted Range feature. Clearly, (9)-(12)
are far more counter-intuitive than (5)-(8). While (7) may be mildly
objectionable, its implausibility is negligible in comparison with (11),
which, according to F^llesdal, says that a " . . . knows the right answers to
all questions of identity" (Fjzfllesdal, [4], p. 15). And it is a consequence of
(9), (10), and (12) that a has what philosophers have called "de re knowledge" regarding everyone who exists.
It would seem unfortunate, therefore, for (l)-(4) to show up as
theorems in variations of KB which lack the Restricted Range feature.
Indeed, it is open for Hintikka to argue that if the theoremhood of (l)-(4) is
an unavoidable feature of a Hintikka-type semantics, then one is really
better off not to avoid the Restricted Range feature (bearing in mind that
the formulas in KBί, which are the formalizations of (9)-(12), are not
theorems in KBl). Yet none of the modifications of KB> minus Restricted
Range, which have been proposed, manage to avoid the theoremhood of

(D-(4).3
Can a plausible system be produced after the fashion of KB which not
only lacks Restricted Range but which fails to make theorems out of (l)-(4)?
Let us begin by investigating just why systems based upon KB; are so prone
to make theorems out of (l)-(4) in the first place. Suppose we concentrate
for the time being upon (1) and see how it's proven in KBi; we utilize
Hintikka's method of reductio proof, demonstrating that '- (x)Ka(x = x)> can
belong to no model set w. Recall that for Hintikka 'Pa' is an abbreviation
for '- Ka - \
(a)
(b)
(c)
'
(d)
(e)
(f)

- (x)Ka(x = x) e w
(Ex)Pa(xΦx) e w
Pa(b Φ b)
ew)
, . „ ,,
v
}
(Ex)Ka(b = x) e w I
b Φb
e w*
b =b
e w*

Counterassumption
(a), (C.-U), (C.-K)
,.. /Hnn\ ,ζ t ,
(b), (108), for some b'
'
'
(c), (C.P1*), where w* is an alternative of w for a
(C.self. =)

The crucial move in this proof is clearly the inference from (b) to (c)
and (d) by way of rule (108). Let us closely examine the rule which allows
this inference. Hintikka's rule (108) is usually thought of as a license which
allows one to movό from formulas of the form ζ(Eχ)KaFx* to ζKaFb' and
i
(Ex)Ka(b = x)\ for some ζb\ in some given model set w. But it is at the
same time a license which allows one to instantiate upon formulas of the
form ((Ex)PaFx9:
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(Ex)PaFx
ew
PaFb
ew
(Ex)Ka(b = x) € w, for some <b\
This latter consequence of rule (108) has been the object of criticism.
Tienson, for example, writes:
But [(108)] also says that if (Ex)PaFx holds, then two other formulas hold, PaFb and
(Ex)Ka(b = x) for some constant b. And this is entirely unreasonable. For it says that
if there is someone who a does not know to be non-F, then a has a unique way of
referring to that person. Since constant terms have descriptive content for Hintikka,
this means that if there is someone of whom you are ignorant in some respect, then
you know something unique about him. But, I believe, by our ordinary understanding
there can be individuals of whom one knows nothing at all. ([12], pp. 5-6)

And according to Sleigh:
What [(108)] seems to say when applied to \Ex)-KaFx' is that anyone a doesn't know
to be F is among the persons known to a. This seems obviously unacceptable. ([10],
p. 6)

There is no doubt that the inference:
(Ex)PaFx
ew
(Ex)Ka(b = x) e w
is highly counter-intuitive. But notice that the proof of (1) does not rely
upon this particular inference (nor the proofs of (3) and (4)). Rather, it is
the other instantiation of ((Ex)PaFx9 licensed by (108),
(Ex)PaFx e w
PaFb
e w,
(let us call it "(**)") which is of concern in the present context of discussion, for all of the formulas (l)-(4) depend upon it to be proven in KB. It is
the crucial move by which one in enabled to get rid of the quantifier(s) in
order to eventually reach the contradiction buried inside the scope of Ψa\
Therefore, without (**) none of the formulas in question can be proven in
KB. In like fashion, it is only through the employment of the rules similar
to (**) that the same theorems turn up in each of the other systems which
have been proposed.4
In order, therefore, to find a way to block proofs of (l)-(4), it looks as
though rules for instantiating i{Ex)PaFx' must be pretty radically revised.
According to Sleigh:
What is required is one set of instantiating conditions for formulas of the form
\Ex)Kaφ' and a distinct set for formulas of the form \Ex)Paφ\ It is possible to
develop a tenable model set approach along these lines which is free of the restricted
range feature of KB but the resulting system is surprisingly complicated. ([ 10], p. 6)

A way must be found to grant instantiation upon ((Ex)PaFx9 only under
certain specified conditions and not in the same indiscriminate fashion
accorded to '(Eχ)KaFx\ Can such a technique be found? And would such a
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technique, if it could be found, make good sense not only on a formal level
but relative to an intuitive possible worlds interpretation as well?
I shall now proceed to propose a system of model sets KB* involving
just such a technique. Consider the following quantifier rules for contexts
in which variables occurring inside the scope of a single epistemic operator
are bound from the outside by quantifiers.
(EK)

(Ex)KaFx
(Ex)Ka(b= x)
KaFb

(UK)

(x)KaFx
ew
(Ex)(b = x)
ew
(Ex)(b = x & KaFx) e w
(Ex)PaFx
e_w_
(Ex)(b = x)
ew
(Ex)(b= x & PaFx) e w, for some 'b'

(EPL)

(EPS!)

(Ex) PaFx
(x)KaGx
PaFb

( EPM) (Ex)(Gx & PaFx)
(x)KaHx
Gc & PaFb

ejv_
ew
e w, for some 'b'

ew
ew
e w, for some cb9
ew
ew
ew, for some (b9, 'c'

(UPL)

(x)PaFx
ew
(Ex)(b = x)
ew
(Eχ)(b = x & PaFx) e w

(UPS!)

(x)PaFx
(Ex)Ka(b = x)
PaFb

ew
ew
e w.

We assume that there are no epistemic operators in ζF9 or (G' and that
(for the sake of simplicity) negation signs have been driven through the
epistemic operators. Following the tradition of others, we list the rules in
a paradigmatic form and explain their use as follows. Rules (EK) and (UK)
apply to any formula in which (x9 occurs free within the scope of any (Ka9
operator. In this way, from ζ(Ex)(Ax & (-Bx v Ka(Cx & - Dx) & KaEx)) e w9,
we may infer both '{Ex)Ka{b = x) e w9 and <(Ab & (- Bb v Ka(Cb & - Db) &
KaEb)) e w\ for some (b9. The other rules apply to all formulas in which
ζ 9
x is bound by at least one 'Pa9 operator but nowhere by a ζKa9 operator.
Thus, ((Ex)(Fx vKaGx)9, ((Ex)(KaFx & KaGx)\ and ((Ex)(KaFx & PaGx)9 fall
under (EK) while ((Ex)(Fx & PaGx)9 and ((Ex){PaFx & PaGx)9 fall under
( EPL), (EPS), or (EPM). Rule ( EPM) is a qualification to (EPS!) and applies
to formulas in which ζx9 occurs both within and without the scope of ζPa9
operators (but nowhere within the scope of (Ka9).
Our system KBi* may now be formed as follows.
of KBΓ. Replace Hintikka's (108) and (109)

Begin with the rules
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(108)

(Ex)KaFx
ew
KaFb
ew
(Ex)Ka(b = x) e w

(Ex)PaFx
ew
PaFb
ew
(Ex)Ka(b = x) e w

(109)

(x)KaFx
ew
(Eχ)Ka(b = x) ew
KaFb
ew

(x)PaFx
ew
(Eχ)Ka(b = x) e w
PaFb
ew
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by the seven rules listed above. Drop from KB the rules:
(C.EK.=*)

(Ex)Ka(b = x) ew
Ka(Ex)(b = x) e w

(C.EK.EK.=*) (Ex)Ka(b = x) e w
(Ex)Ka(b = x) e w *, for every alternative w* of w for a.5
And for purposes of convenience add the rules:
(C..E-)
(C.U-)
(C.K-)
(C..P-)

(Ex)Fx
ew
- (x) - Fx
ew
(x)Fx
ew_
- (Ex) - Fx e w
Kap
e_w_
- Pa - p
ew
Pap
e_w_
- Ka - p
ew.

And to all of this we add a set of rules, to be described in what follows, to
govern formulas formed by quantifying in contexts two or more layers deep
of epistemic operators.
Our first order of business is to establish that our system lacks the
Restricted Range feature. For this it suffices to show that
(x)KaFx e w
(x)Fx
ew
is provable in KB*:
(a) (x)KaFx
ew )
_
,.
, .
J
Counterassumption
lΛ v
(b) - (x)Fx
ew j
(c) (Ex) 'Fx
ew
(b), (C.-U)
(d) - Fb
ew
(c), (C.E 0 ), for some (b>
(e) (Ex)(b=x)
ew
(c), (C.E 0 )
(f) (Ex)(b = x & KaFx) e w
(a), (e), (UK)
(g) b = c & KaFc
€w \
v
( , ,
Kh K
}
(h) (Ex)Ka(c =x)
ew)
(i) KaFc
ew
(g), Simp
(j) Fc
ew
(i), (C.K*), Reflexivity
(k) b = c
ew
(g), Simp
(1) - Fc
ew
(d), (k), (C.=).
Notice that a similar proof cannot be produced in KB; one may proceed as
far as step (e), but the move from (a) and (e) to (f) is not allowed in KB.
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As far as instantiation on '(x)KaFx' is concerned, our system is
actually more liberal than KB. Our rule (UK) allows instantiation on
'(x)KaFxy, in a sort of large-scope fashion, with the auxiliary clause
(
(Ex)(b = x)'; KB has no such provision. At the same time, Hintikka's
(small-scope) instantiation rule
(x)KaFx
ew
(Ex)Ka(b = x) e w
KaFb
ew
is a consequence of our rules:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)

(x)KaFx
(Ex)Ka{b = x)
- KaFb
(Ex)(b = x)
(Ex){b = x & KaFx)
b = c & KaFc
(Ex)Ka(c = x)
KαFc
b =c
Ka(b = c)
- KaFc

e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e

w\
w 1
w)
w
w
w \
w j
w
w
w
w

Counterassumption
(b), (C.EK.=)
(a), (d), (UK)
, v . v
(f), Simp
(f), Simp
(b), (g), (i)
(c), (j), (97).

As the other end of the spectrum, however, our instantiation rules for 'Pa'
are much less liberal than in KB. This, of course, is all a part of our
attempt to block proofs of formulas (l)-(4). If we try, for example, to
prove (1) by assuming that ((Ex)Pa(x Φ x)y belongs to a model set w, we can
infer both ζ(Ex)(b = x) e w' and *(Ex)(δ = x & Pa(x Φ X)) e w\ But we can
infer nothing that yields a contradiction; we lack the means to peel off the
quantifier and get at what is inside the epistemic operator (the means of
which is present in all of the other systems).
Thus our rules succeed very nicely in blocking the proofs of the
unwanted theorems by making at least one of Hintikka's key quantifier rules
drastically weaker. But by introducing a set of rules which blocks the
proofs of the unwanted theorems might we not have produced a system
which fails to make good sense relative to an intended possible worlds
interpretation of formulas in KB*? Perhaps the natural intuitions which
underlie Hintikka's rules taken as a whole will be, once these rules have
been tampered with, gone for good, and we shall be left with a new set of
rules which are artificial, contrived, and unable to be backed with the
authority of an intuitive model.
In order to describe in an absolutely precise fashion the intuitions
underlying KB* and the ways in which they differ from those of KB we
examine in the appendix a higher-order theory W. Here we shall discuss
informally a number of these underlying intuitions. The basic idea, as
described by Hintikka, is this:
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Existential generalization with respect to a term—say b— is admissible in (epistemic)
contexts if b refers to one and the same man in all the "possible worlds" we have to
c o n s i d e r . . . . Now clearly b refers to one and the same man in all these states of
affairs if there is someone who is known by the bearer of a to be referred to by Z? . . . .
In short, b refers to one and the same man in all the "possible worlds" we have to consider in this special case if it is true to say "α knows who b is". But this is exactly what
our solution amounts to here: existential generalization with respect to b is admissible
if we have as an a d d i t i o n a l premise the sentence "α knows who b is", formally
"(Ejc)J&i(&=jc)".([6],pp. 152-153)

An individual b is known by a just in case 'b' refers to the same
individual in each possible world compatible with everything a knows. We
can imagine a line drawn connecting each of these individuals from world to
world. Since such a line is said to pick out "the same" individual in each
compatible world, we might call a world line which connects individuals in
this fashion "rigid". It would then be natural to interpret the formulas of
KB and KB* in such a way that an individual is known to u in a world w just
in case one of a9s rigid world lines picks up that individual in w (for simplicity let us assume a is the only agent).
Given such an interpretation, the differences in the intuitions underlying KB and KB* are as follows: First, in KB a rigid world line picks out
an individual in a world only if the individual exists in that world (Hintikka
later dropped this restriction from KB—see footnote 5), whereas this is not
so in KB*. And, second, because KB* lacks Restricted Range and KB does
not, the truth of ((x)KaFx9 in a world does not in KB necessitate that every
existent individual in that world is picked up by a rigid world line, as is the
case in KB*. Thus, ((x)KaFx e w9 is interpreted in KB* as
(13) Anything which exists in w is picked up by a rigid world line which in
every compatible world picks up something which is J? in that world.
and in KB as
(14) If anything exists in w and is picked up by a rigid world line, this
world line in every compatible world picks up something which exists and
is F in that world.
ζ

9

The formula (x)KaFx e w asserts in KB*, therefore, that
(15) For any x which exists in w, (i) x is picked up by a rigid world line,
and (ii) This world line picks up something in each compatible world which
is F in that world.
Similarly, '{Ex)KaFx e w9 asserts that
(16) For some x which exists in w, conditions (i) and (ii) hold.
Thus ί(x)PaFx e w9 (because it is equivalent to ((x) - Ka - Fx e w9) asserts
(17) For any x which exists in w, either (if) x is not picked up by a rigid
world line, or (ii') The rigid world line which picks up x does not in every
compatible world pick up something which is not-F in that world,
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and '(Ex)PaFx e w9 asserts
(18) For some x which exists in w, either (i') or (iif) holds.
The intuitions which underlie the rules of KB * are now easy to explain.
(EK!), also valid in KB, simply licenses us to start with (16) and perform
existential instantiation upon it, first upon condition (i), then upon condition
(ii) to a constant 'b9 which names the object picked out by the rigid world
line at every compatible world. (UK) tells us that (15) may be instantiated
to any constant 'b\ provided b exists in w. (EPL) states that existential
instantiation may be performed upon (18). (EPS') asserts that from (18) and
(15), with 'F9 in (15) replaced by any predicate constant whatever, it follows
that for some 'b9, b is F in at least one world w* compatible with w (this
may be checked out as valid). (EPIW) is merely a qualification to (EPS!) to
the effect that if b is the individual which is F in w*, the individual picked
out in w by the same rigid world line might not be referred to as (b9 in w.
(UPLi) licenses us to instantiate (17) to 'b9, provided b exists in w. And
(UPS) states that from (17), the assumption that b exists in w, that b fulfills
condition (i), and that the rigid world line which picks up b in w picks up b
in every compatible world (we do not assume that this condition is automatically satisfied), we may infer that b is F in at least one world compatible with w (this too may be checked out to be valid).
The failure of (**) to be valid in KB* may now be explained as follows.
If we start with (18) and try to show that some individual b is F in at least
one world compatible with w, we must somehow show that some individual
which exists in w (c, for example) fulfills condition (ii'). But (18) tells us
only that some such individual fulfills either (i') or (ii') We need to know
in addition that c fails to fulfill condition (if). In the case of (EPS!) this
additional information comes by way of assuming (15), which guarantees
that every individual existent in w fulfills (i) and hence fails (if). But without this extra information the demonstration cannot proceed, and (**) is
invalid.
So far we have restricted our attention to formulas in KB* in which
variables occur within the scope of, at most, one epistemic operator. We
now present a set of rules general enough to cover all formulas in KB*
formed by quantifying past several epistemic operators. The expressions
'Qa9 and 'Q'a9 designate arbitrary strings formed by concatenating 'Ka9 and
'Pa9; the cases in which (Qa9 and 'Q'a9 designate the empty string are those
which involve quantifying past a single epistemic operator and yield the
quantifier rules we listed earlier. The official version of our quantifier
rules for KB * shall then be as follows:
(EK)

(UK)

(Ex)KaQaFx
e_w_
(Ex)Ka(b = x)
ew
KaQaFb
e w, for some 'b9
(x)KaQaFx
ew
(Ex)(b = x)
€w
(Ex)(b = x & KaQaFx) e w
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(EPL) (Ex)PaQaFx
ejw_
(Ex)(b = x)
ew
(Ex)(b = x & PaQaFx) e w, for some 'b'
(EPS) (Ex)PaQaFx
(x)KaGx

ew
€w

PaQaFb
e w, for some 'b'
(UPL) (x)PaQaFx
ew
(Ex)(b = x)
ew
(Ex)(b = x & PaQaFx) e w
(UPS) (x)PaQaFx
ew
(Ex)Ka(b = x)
e_w_
PaQaFb
( EPEi) (Ex)QaPaPaQtaFx
(Ex)QaPaQraFx
(EKE) (Ex)QaKaQfaFx
(Ex)QaQraFx

(EKI) {Ex)QaKaQ!aFx
(Ex)QaKaKaQ'aFx
(EPI) (Ex)QaPaQraFx
(Ex)QaPaPaQ'aFx

ew
ew
ew
e_w_
ew

e_w_
e w
e_w_
e w.

As before, the rules are formulated in a paradigmatic fashion for
purposes of simplicity, but their range of application extends to any
formula in KB* formed by quantifying past one or more epistemic operators. Thus, rule (EK) is not limited to formulas such as ((E x)KaKaPaKaFx9
but applies as well to something like '(Ex)(Ey)((-Ax vBy) & Ka(Cx &
Pa(-By v Dx)))9. Two stipulations, however, must be laid down in reference
to these rules. The first is that rules (EK) and (UK) apply to all formulas
in which (xf occurs free within the scope of some (Ka' operator itself not
bound by any epistemic operators; only in cases where this condition is not
met will rules (EPL), (EPS), (UPL), and (UPS) apply. Thus, <{Ex){KaFx &
PaGx)', ((Ex)(Fx &KaPaPaGx)\ and ((Ex)(PaKaFx & KaGxV all fall under
rule (EK) while <(Ex)(PaKaKaFx)' and ((Ex)(PaFx & PaKaGx)9 fall under
(EPL) or (EPS).
Our second stipulation is this: In applying rule (EPS), a pair of free
'#'s are to be instantiated to the same constant when and only when there
is no occurrence of 'Pa' binding one and not the other; in all other cases
distinct constants must be used. Thus, while with (EK), ((EX)(FX V KaGx)'
instantiates to (Fb v KaGb\ ζ(Ex)(Fx v PaGx)' is instantiated to 'Fc v PaGb'
since one 'x' is bound by an occurrence of 'Pa' not binding the other.
'(Ex)(PaFx & PaGx)' too requires two constants (each (χ' is bound by a 'Pa'
(
9
not binding the other), while (Ex)(Bx & Pa(Cx & PaDx) & Ax) requires
three and instantiates to something of the form 'Be & PaiCd & PaDb) & Ac'
(the two outside clauses take the same constant). In the case of rules (EK)
and (UPS) every free occurrence of 'x' instantiates to the same constant
6
and no such stipulation need be observed.
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APPENDIX
Let us turn our attention towards a possible worlds interpretation 9W of the formulas in
KB* and examine our rules in light of this interpretation. Rather than simply describe SOT,
however, we shall follow Sleigh's lead and construct an interpreted, higher-order theory W which
talks about 9W in that the truth-conditions for formulas of KB* relative to 9W are made explicit.7
In this way we can judge with a good deal more precision the adequacy of the rules of KB*.
Following Sleigh, we shall call W the "world theory" of KB*, and a formula in W which describes
the truth-conditions in SOT of a formula VΓ will be called the "world theory transcription" of 'Ά9
in W. Having done this, it will be very easy to judge whether KB* is an adequate system. Any
inference
A ew
B €W
must be provable in KB* if and only if 'A* -+ B*9 is provable in W, where 'A*' and *B*9 are the
respective world theory transcriptions of Ά9 and '/?'.
The language of W can be described as follows:
(i)

Every symbol in KB* except kKa9 and 7V belongs to the language of W\

(ii)

In addition:

7*' is a one-place predicate constant in W
'£" is a two-place predicate constant in W
*R9 is a two-place predicate constant in W
'Bγ, 'B2\ etc., are two-place predicate constants in W
7Y, 7Y, etc., are two-place predicate variables in W
*W|', *Wj', etc., are variables in W
'w/ is a constant in W;
(iii) Atomic well-formed formulas are as follows:
(a) If 'A9 is a wff in KB*, then if 'A' contains no occurrences of *Ka\ 7V, or individual constant
terms, '04 )w/' is a wff in w, for any /
(b) Ί*Pi* is a wff in W, for any i
(c) Έxwi9 is a wff in W, for any i and any variable or constant x in W
(d) 7?W| w/ is a wff in W, for any /,/
(e) ΨjXWj' is a wff in W, for any /,/ and any variable or constant x in W
(f) 'BiXwf is a wff in W, for any /,/ and any variable or constant x in W.
Intuitively, atomic formulas in W are to be understood in the following way. \A)Wi asserts
that a formula 'A' of KB* is true in world w, (relative to 9W). 7*/γ asserts that a world line Px
is "privileged" in the sense of "rigid" described earlier.8 Έxwf is understood to say that x exists in
world W|. Ψixwf asserts that world line Pt picks up object x at world w; . 7?w, w; ' asserts that
world Wj is an alternative to w, (relative to a). And 'BiXwf is understood to say simply that x is
Bt at Wj. In what follows we shall refer to the '5,-' predicates as "Badge Predicates".
I believe we now have the machinery to express in the language of W the explicit truthconditions of any formula in KB* relative to our intended model SOT. We now give a recursive
procedure to show how to derive, for any formula Ά9 in KB*, the world theory transcription
Ά*9 of 'A' in W. We begin by defining the notion 'Immediate W-translation' (Ί^-translation' for
short). For purposes of abbreviation we shall shorten 'w/ to 7' throughout and for convenience
we shall assume that '&' and '-' are the only truth-connectives in Ά9. First, we suppose that 'A9
contains no individual constant terms from the language of KB*.
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If F is atomic, the I W-translation of F is \F)V
If F is of the form "B & C\ the I W-translation of F is \B)i & (C)Γ
If Fis of the form '-#', the I W-translation of Fis '-((5)/)'
If F is of the form 'KαB\ then

(a) If every free variable in B is bound in B by at least one epistemic operator, the I W-translation
of F is \j)(Rij ^ (B)jY
(b) If * ! , . . . , xn occur free in B outside the scope of all epistemic operators in B, the IW-translation ofFis VKRij->(Ey1). . . (Eyn)(Pιyιf& . . . &Pnynj&(B(yk/xk))f))\
where Foccurs within
the context'. . . (I*Pι & P^^ΐ)... &
(I*Pn & Pnxni) . . . & . . . F . . . '
(v) If F is of the form ΨαB\ the I W-translation of F is '-Kα - By
(vi) If F is of the form \Ex)B\ then
(a) If V does not occur free in B, the I W-translation of F is '(2?)f
(b) If V occurs free in 2? but never within the scope of an epistemic operator, the I W-translation
ofFis'(E*)(£xι &(£)/)'
(c) If V occurs free in i? and for at least one occurrence of 'Kα' not directly preceded by an odd
number of negation signs, V occurs within its scope and it (the 'Kα') occurs within the scope of
no epistemic operator, then
(i) If B is of the form '-(C & DY and V occurs only within the scope of epistemic operators,
the I W-translation of F is \Ex)(Exi & -((EF1)(/*P1 & Pxxi & (C)i) & (EP2)(I*P2 & P2xi & (/))/)))'
(ii) Otherwise the I W-translation of Fis \Ex)(Exi & (EP1)(/*/)1 & /V' & (#)/))'
(d)

In all other cases the I W-translation of Fis \Ex)(Exi & (P^^Pi&PtXi)

-> (£)/))'

(viii) If F is of the form \x)B\ the IW translation of F is '-(Ex) - B\
Here we let '/' be a meta-linguistic variable whose value is determined as follows. If *F' is ςΛ',
then 7' stands for V. And if 'F' is '£' in the procedure prescribed below, then 7' stands for the
variable '/' in the quantifier '(£>)' or '(/)' most directly binding Έ\ If 'F' is '£" and there is no
such quantifier, then '/' stands for V.
We now say that a formula 'G° is the 'W-translation' of a formula Ψ* if and only if (i) There
is a finite sequence of formulas F l 5 . . . , Fn such that Fλ is the I W-translation of F, F / + 1 is the
I W-translation of Fi} for all /, and G is the I W-translation of Fn, and (ii) For every sub formula in G
of the form \A)i\ 'A' is atomic. On the basis of all of this we now calculate V4*' in the following
way. Let Άγ be the Immediate W-translation of ιA\ Now let '/)' be the leftmost subformula in
Άf which is of the form \E)V for some i and'non-atomic formula '£'. Then '^4/+1' is the formula
obtained by replacing '£>' by the W-translation of '£', if it has one, and by its Immediate W-translation otherwise. When a formula 'Af is reached in which there is no such subformula '/)', then
•Λ/'is'Λ*'.
If 'A' contains constant singular terms from the language of KB*, we derive it as follows.
Since KB* is a system of our own making there is no problem in assuming that for each constant
singular term '&' in KB* there is a badge predicate in KB* which holds uniquely of b. Replace
every subformula '(Ex)C' in '5' by \Ex){Ex & C)\ every subformula '(JC)C' in ς2Γ by \x)(Ex -> C)\
and every atomic subformula 7)' in 'iΓ which contains a constant singular term '6' by '(Ex)
φφ/x) & B/x)\ where '£/ is the badge predicate of '6' in KB* and '£' is not a symbol in KB*.
When all singular terms have been eliminated the result is Ά\ Now go to the recursive procedure
outlined above with the following revision of Ί W-translation'. Add to the first line of (vi), " . . . if
B is of the form "Ex & C , then", and add "(vii) If F is of the form \Ex)B" and B is not of the
form 'Ex & C\ then . . . " followed by (a)-(d) of (vi) with the clause Έxϊ deleted everywhere it
occurs.
Let us now look at some examples of basic formulas and their respective world theory
transcriptions in W. From now on we shall often abbreviate \B)V as 'Bi\
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(i)

KaB:
(i)(Rri->(B)i)
(ii) {Ex)KaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (EΛ)((/*Λ & Pixr) & Q){Rri -* {Ey){Pxyi & ^ ί ) ) ) )
(iii) (x)KaBx:
(x)(Exr -> (EP1X(/*/>1 & Pxxr) & (i)(Rri -> (Ej>)(Λ.W & £>Ό)))
(iv) (ExXCx&Jβi&c):
(Ex)(Exr & (EΛ)((/*Λ & / \ * Ό & Ocr & (O(Λri -> (EJO(/V* & Byi))))
(v) (Ex)PaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (P 1 )((/*P 1 & Λ * Ό -» (E/)(Λπ & ( E /XΛJΊ" & £y/))))
(vi) (Ex)(KaBx & PaCx):
(Ex)(Exr & (E/\X(/*P & Pxxr) & «ί)(Rri -» {Ey){Pλyi & Byi)) & (Eί)(Λrί & (Έ.y){Pxyi &
Cyi)))))
(vii) (Ex)KaKaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (E/Ί)((/*Λ & Λ * Ό & (O(Λπ -* (/)(Λ// -> (Ej;)(Λy/ & (W)))))
(viii) (E;c)(A:α(5x & ^ΛCJC)):
( E x ) ( ^ r & (EΛ)((/*Λ & Pxxr) & (i)(Rri -> ((E^XΛ^* & ^ / ) & Q')(Rij -> ( E J X P ^ / &

W))))»
(ix) (Ex)PaKaBx:
(Ex)(Exr & (Pi)((I*Pι & Pxxr) -> (EiXΛri & (/XΛ// -> (E^XP^y & ^

))))).

It is a simple matter, incidentally, to assign world theory transcriptions in W to formulas in
Hintikka's KB. We need to make only two alterations to our definition of Ί W-translation' as
follows:

R e p l a c e V)(Rij

-+ (Eyλ).

. . (Ey^iP^J

& . . . & Pnynj

& (B(yk/xk))i)Y

b y \j){Rij

-•

(E^i). . . (Eyn)((P1yJ & . . . & P π ^ n ;) & (EyJ & . . . & £>„/) & (B(yk/xk))i)))\
and delete part
(vi)-(c). The differences in the intuitions underlying the rules of KB and the rules of KB*, therefore, are twofold. Privileged world lines in KB pick out individuals in worlds only if they happen
to exist in such worlds (Hintikka actually has now dropped this restriction by dropping his rule
(C.EK.=*)). And the truth of \x)KaFx' in a world does not in KB necessitate that every existent
individual in that world is picked up by a privileged world line, as is the case in KB*.
Finally, axioms for W are as follows:
(i)
VXRii)
(ii) (i)(j)(k)((Rij&Rjk)-+Rik)
(iii) (ΛX'XExXΛ*/ & {y){Pxyi = Pίxi))
(iv) (ΛXP2)(*)W(0(/XCPi*/ & ?2χi & Rϋ) -* (ΛJ>/ Ξ Piyj))
(v) ΓXEΛXOCKXΛ** Ξ BjXi)~\ is an axiom, for any badge predicate \β/.
With these axioms we can prove world theory transcriptions of the theorems of KB*.9

NOTES
1. See for example Castaήeda [1], p. 134, Castaneda [2], pp. 9, ff., Clark [3], pp. 177, ff.,
Sellars [8], pp. 191, 195-198, and Stine [11], pp. 127-129. For an excellent discussion of
these criticisms see Sleigh [9].
2. F^llesdal [4], pp. 11-13, Sleigh [9], pp. 69-71 (the system K), and Tienson [12], pp. 7-8.
Still a fourth system lacking Restricted Range has been proposed by Stine in [11], pp. 131,
ff., but it is a vastly different kind of system from KB and all of the others, and hence we
shall not regard it as a modification of KB in what follows.
3.

In F^llesdaΓs system the theorems in question are actually
(Γ) (x)-Pa-(x=x)
(2') (x)(Ey)-Pa-(x=y)

AN ALTERNATIVE SEMANTICS FOR KNOWLEDGE

277

(3') {x)(y)(x=y-+-Pa-(x = y))
(4') (x) - Pa - (Fx v - Fx),
which in his system are not equivalent, respectively, with (l)-(4). As Stine suggests in [11],
p. 137, however, the English readings corresponding to formulas such as these are really not
much better off than (9)-(l 2).
4. A detailed discussion of this point appears in [7], Chapter Four.
5. Rule (C.EK.=*) is dropped by Hintikka in [5], p. 4, along with his rule (C.EK.=) for reasons
he does not make clear. Because (C.EK=*) and (C.EK.EK=*) are both unnecessary and may
be argued to be mildly implausible ("Knowing who b is entails knowing that b exists" and
"Knowing who b is entails knowing that one knows who b is", respectively), we do not include them in KB*. We do, however, retain (C.EK.=): From \Ex)Ka(b = x) e w' infer '(Ex)
(b = x) e w\
6. I wish to thank Edmund L. Gettier III for numerous discussions concerning the subject matter
of this paper. Also, I am indebted to Robert C. Sleigh, Jr. for criticisms of an earlier version of
this paper.
7. Sleigh [9], pp. 71-73. In doing so we shall in effect specify only the features of 3W which are
relevant to the task of semantically evaluating our rules.
8. From a formal point of view we leave ourselves uncommitted as to whether the privileged
world lines in 501 are all and only the rigid world lines. Thus, we leave ourselves open to the
future possibility of regarding privileged world lines as some particular subclass of all the rigid
world lines.
9. A number of such proofs may be found in [7], Chapter Five.
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